Abstract We investigate a new approach to modal hypersequents, called relational hypersequents, which incorporates an accessibility relation along the hypersequent. These systems are an adaptation of Restall (2009)'s cut-free complete hypersequent system for S5. Variation between modal systems in the relational framework occurs only in the presence or absence of structural rules, which conforms to Došen's principle. All systems are modular except for that of S5. We provide the first cut-free completeness result for K, T, and D, and show how this method fails in the case of B and S4.
Introduction
Modal sequent calculi have been developed for K and many of its extensions, but it has been difficult to develop sequent systems that have nice prooftheoretic properties. The cut elimination theorem is an important result in structural proof theory: any sequent that is derivable in a calculus can be derived without the use of cut. Notably, Ohnishi and Matsumoto (1959) 's sequent system for S5 is not cut-free. Although cut-free sequent systems for S5 were later developed by Braüner (2000) and Ohnishi (1982) , this issue prompted research into extensions of the sequent calculus that could better accommodate modal logics. Hypersequent calculi for modal logics were originally developed by Pottinger (1983) , who provides a cut-free hypersequent system for S5. There has since been a proliferation of hypersequent approaches to modal logic (Avron 1996; Brünnler 2009; Restall 2009; Poggiolesi 2011; Lahav 2013; Lellmann 2015; Parisi 2016) .
In addition to cut elimination, there are other desiderata that one might consider when developing hypersequent calculi. We consider two such properties of hypersequent systems that have been proposed as important. One is modularity: each axiom, or property of the accessibility relation, is captured by a single rule or set of rules. The other is Došen's principle: hypersequent systems for different modal logics should only differ in the presence or absence of structural rules.
A recent development in the proof theory of modal logics are relational hypersequents. These systems have their origin in Restall (2009) , who introduced a cut-free complete hypersequent calculus for S5. Restall left it an open question whether or not his method could be adapted to other extensions of K. Parisi (2016) proposed relational hypersequent calculi for the logics K, T, B, D and S4 along the lines of Restall's approach. However, Parisi proved completeness only for the systems with the cut rule. Parisi's systems are the first candidates for calculi for modal logics that conforms to Došen's principle. In this paper, we prove cut-free completeness for the relational hypersequent systems for K, T and D.
For the modal logic K, the interpretation of the relational hypersequent is equivalent to that of the linear nested sequent, as in Lellmann (2015) , but there are some important differences. Relational hypersequent systems interpret a sequent as a branch of possible worlds separated by an accessibility relation, rather than a disjunction of sequents under a nested modal operator. In other words, the systems considered in this paper are more explicit about the accessibility relation along the hypersequent. It follows that the relational hypersequent does not have a straightforward formula interpretation as the linear nested sequent does. However, these systems do have an advantage over linear nested sequents insofar as they are currently the only modal hypersequent systems that conform to Došen's principle. The base calculus RK contains a pair of rules for , and extensions of RK for other systems add structural rules, but no rules that mention .
In the next section we introduce the relational hypersequent calculi for K, T, D, B, S4 and S5, and prove that they are sound for the appropriate classes of frames. In section 3 we provide the first cut-free completeness result for RK, the relational hypersequent calculus for K. In section 4 we show how this proof can be altered in order to obtain cut-free completeness for T and D. Finally, in section 5 we show this method fails for the logics B and S4.
2 Relational Hypersequent Calculi Definition 1 We call any expression of the form Γ = ⇒ ∆ a sequent, where Γ and ∆ are multisets of formulas.
A hypersequent is any expression of the form G H, where G and H are sequences of sequents.
The rules for the calculus RK, sound and complete for K, are found in table 1. To keep the subsequent proofs simple, we give only the logical rules for ¬, ∧, and . The rules for ∨ and → are as usual, and rules for ♦ are symmetrical to those for . Calculi for extensions of K are obtained by adding external structural rules, which each characterize a property of the accessibility Tables  2 and 3. Note that it is generally the case that these systems are modular: each external structural rule represents an axiom. However, this is not the case for the system RS5, as the EE rule does not only capture symmetry, but also transitivity. This way of capturing S5 is equivalent to that of Restall (2009) , but one may also straightforwardly replace the EE rule with Sym. The resultant calculus would be complete, but not cut-free complete.
The semantics of relational hypersequents are given in terms of absence of counterexamples.
Definition 2 (Branch of worlds) Let F be a frame and w 1 , . . . , w n be worlds. The sequence w 1 , . . . , w n forms a branch of worlds in F if for each 1 ≤ i < n, w i Rw i+1 Definition 3 (Countermodel) A model M is a countermodel to a sequent Γ = ⇒ ∆ at a world w iff ∀ϕ ∈ Γ, M, w ϕ and ∀ψ ∈ ∆, M, w ψ. 
there is a branch of worlds w 1 , . . . , w n such that M is a countermodel to each sequent
Definition 5 (Valid hypersequent) A hypersequent H is valid in a class of frames F just in case there is no counter-example to it that is in F. Otherwise, we say that the hypersequent is invalid.
Soundness proofs for the relational calculi can be found in Parisi (2016) . Most of the cases are routine; we give the cases for ∧R, , EWL and EWR as examples.
Theorem 1 (Soundness) If ⊢ RK H, then there is no counter-example to H.
Proof
The proof proceeds by induction on the length of a derivation. Let β be the last inference of δ.
1. Base Case: β is an instance of an axiom, (ϕ = ⇒ ϕ). There is no model M and possible world w i such that M, w i ϕ and M, w i ϕ.
2. β is an instance of the ∧R rule.
. . , w n form a counter-example to the conclusion. So w 1 , . . . , w n forms a branch of worlds such that w k Rw k+1 and M is a countermodel to each sequent
In either case, we obtain a contradiction. 3. β is an instance of L.
. . , w n forms a counter-example to the conclusion. M must be a countermodel to ϕ,
In particular, we know that w i Rw i+1 . Since M, w 1 , . . . , w n is a counter-example to the lower hypersequent, M, w i Γ i+1 and M, w i+1 θ for all θ ∈ ∆ i+1 . So M is also a countermodel to the sequent (ϕ, Γ i+1 = ⇒ ∆ i+1 ) at w i+1 . So M, w 1 , . . . , w n is also a counterexample to the premise. 4. β is an instance of R.
Suppose that M, w 1 , . . . , w n forms a counter-example to the conclusion. M must be a counter-example to Γ 1 = ⇒ ∆ 1 , ϕ at w n . This means that M, w n ϕ. So, there is some possible world v such that w n Rv and M, v ϕ. But this means that M is also a countermodel to the sequent (= ⇒ ϕ) at w n+1 , since w n Rw n+1 . So M, w 1 , . . . , w n is also a counter-example to the premise. 5. β is an instance of EWR.
. . .
Suppose that M, w 1 , . . . , w n forms a counter-example to the conclusion of the inference. M is a countermodel to
follows that M, w 1 , . . . , w n−1 must also be a counter-example to G, which is a contradiction. 6. β is an instance of EWL. The proof is symmetrical to the EWR case.
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 2 If ⊢ RT H, then there is no reflexive counter-example to H.
Proof We show that the EC rule is sound for reflexive frames. Consider:
Since the frame is reflexive, w i Rw i . So w 1 , . . . , w i , w i , . . . , w n is a branch of worlds where w j is a counter-example to Γ j = ⇒ ∆ j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n. But this means that M is a counter-example to the premise
Proof We show that the Sym rule is sound for symmetric frames.
Let M, w 1 , . . . , w n be a counter-example to the conclusion, i.e., w n , . . . , w 1 is a branch of worlds such that w i+1 Rw i and M is a countermodel to Γ i = ⇒ ∆ i at w i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since the frame is symmetric, it follows that w i Rw i+1 . So w 1 , . . . , w n also forms a branch of such that M is a countermodel to each Γ i = ⇒ ∆ i at w i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i.e., M is a counter-example to the premise.
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 4 If ⊢ RD H, then there is no serial counter-example to H.
Proof We show that the Drop rule is sound for symmetric frames.
. . , w n be a counter-example to the conclusion. This means that there is a branch of worlds w 1 , . . . , w n such that w i Rw i+1 and M is a countermodel to each Γ i = ⇒ ∆ i at w i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since the frame is serial, it must be the case that there is some world w n+1 such that w n Rw n+1 . M is a countermodel to the empty sequent at w n+1 . It follows that M is a counterexample to the premise. ⊓ ⊔ Theorem 5 If ⊢ R4 H, then there is no transitive counter-example to H.
Proof It suffices to show that the EW rule is sound for transitive frames.
. . , w n be a counter-example to the conclusion, where
. . . Γ n = ⇒ ∆ n . So there is a branch of worlds w 1 , . . . , w i , w, w i+1 , . . . , w n such that w k Rw k+1 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, w i Rw, wRw i+1 and M is a countermodel to each Γ k = ⇒ ∆ k at w k for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Since wRw i+1 , w i Rw, and the frame is transitive, it follows that w i Rw i+1 . So w 1 , . . . , w i , w i+1 , . . . , w n is also a branch of worlds and M is a countermodel to each Γ k = ⇒ ∆ k at w k for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. But this means that M is also a counter-example to the premise.
If either G or H is empty, then this is an application of EWL or EWR, respectively, which we have shown are sound.
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 6 If ⊢ RS5 H, then there is no reflexive, transitive and symmetric counter-example to H.
Proof It suffices to show that the EE rule is sound for transitive, symmetric frames. Suppose that β is an application of the EE rule.
. . , w n form a counter-example to the conclusion of the inference.
So there is a branch of worlds w 1 , . . . , w i−1 , w i+1 , w i , w i+2 , . . . , w n such that M is a countermodel to Γ k = ⇒ ∆ k at w k for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. We know that w i−1 Rw i+1 , w i+1 Rw i and w i Rw i+2 . Since the frame is transitive, w i−1 Rw i and w i+1 Rw 1+2 . Since the frame is also symmetric, w i Rw i+1 . It follows that w 1 , . . . , w i−1 , w i , w i+1 , w i+2 , . . . , w n is a branch of worlds such that M is a countermodel to Γ k = ⇒ ∆ k at w k for 1 ≤ k ≤ n. It follows that M is is a counter-example to the premise.
The above also holds with G, H empty. ⊓ ⊔
Cut-free Completeness for RK
To prove cut-free completeness, we show that for every unprovable hypersequent H, there is a counter-example. The counter-example is constructed by assigning hypersequents to elements of a tree T ⊆ N * such that (a) each hypersequent is unprovable, (b) it is maximal in this respect ("fully reduced"), (c) components labelled by σ of any two hypersequents assigned to elements of T are identical. We then define the counter-example using T , R, and V where σ ∈ V (p) iff p occurs on the lhs of any (and by (c) all) components labelled σ).
We then show that this model falsifies every component Γ σ = ⇒ Γ at σ. This relies on the fact that each hypersequent is fully reduced and the definitions of hypersequents assigned to successors of σ.
Definition 6 A subset T of N * is a tree if whenever σ.n ∈ T then σ ∈ T . We consider four relations on T :
1. The successor order R: σ, σ ′ iff σ ′ = σ.n. 2. The reflexive closure R ′ of R. 3. The transitive closure R + of R. 4. The reflexive transitive closure R * of R.
Σ is a path through T if it is a branch of T and for all σ ∈ T , not Rσσ 1 and not Rσ n σ (i.e., paths are maximal branches, although they need not be maximal in the order R ′ or R * ).
Obviously R ′ is reflexive, R + is transitive, and R * is reflexive and transitive.
Definition 7 A labelled hypersequent is a sequence Γ 1
If H is a labelled hypersequent, then H(σ) is the rightmost component Γ σ = ⇒ ∆ in H or the empty sequent if H has no such component, and Σ(H) is the sequence of labels σ 1 . . . σ n in H. We write Γ (σ) and ∆(σ) for the sets of formulas such that 
In each case, a hypersequent is called σ-reduced if it is identical to all of its σ-reducts, otherwise it is σ-reducible. If it is σ-reduced for all σ occurring in it as labels, it is called fully reduced.
Proposition 1 If H is unprovable, any σ-reduct of it is also unprovable.
Proof If the σ-reduct of H were provable, the relevant rule (together with contractions) would prove H. For instance, suppose G Γ
must be unprovable. For suppose both were provable. Then we'd have:
Or, suppose the σ-reduct based on the L-rule were provable. Then we'd have:
Proposition 2 Every unprovable labelled hypersequent H is extended by an unprovable, fully reduced hypersequent Red(H) (called its full reduction).
Proof If H is already fully reduced, we have nothing to prove. Otherwise, there is a least σ so that H is not σ-reduced. Any σ-reduction of a reducible hypersequent extends it. So, starting with the set {H} and adding σ-reductions results in a set of unprovable hypersequents, partially ordered by extension. This set is finite, as can easily be seen by induction on the number and degree of formulas in H(σ) and the number of formulas of the form ϕ in H(σ ′ ). A maximal element in this order is an unprovable σ-reduced hypersequent extending H. The proposition follows by induction on the number of components of H.
Proof Since H is σ-reduced, H(σ) is identical to all its σ-reducts. This establishes (1)-(4). For (5), suppose that ϕ ∈ Γ (σ ′ ), Rσ ′ σ and σ occurs as a label in H. Since H is σ-reduced, H(σ) is identical to its L σ-reducts. Since Σ(H) is a branch, the component H(σ ′ ) occurs immediately to the left of H(σ), i.e.,
is an unprovable fully reduced hypersequent, and ψ ∈ ∆. The σ.n-ψ-successor Succ
Proposition 4 We record some facts about the successor construction.
1. The σ.n-ψ-successor of an unprovable, fully reduced hypersequent is unprovable.
If H
′ is a σ.n-ψ-successor of H and R * τ σ, then H(τ ) = H ′ (τ ) (i.e., passing to successors does not change the sequent labelled σ or any to the left of it).
Proof 1. The successor is the full reduction of a hypersequent which is unprovable if the original hypersequent is. For suppose it were provable, then: 
Let H ′ be the full reduction of
with σ i = 0 . . . 0 with i 0's, and let
. Define a partial mapping λ from N * to labelled hypersequents inductively by:
Let T be the set of all σ ∈ N * such that λ(σ) is defined and S(H) = {λ(σ) : σ ∈ T }.
Proposition 5
We record some facts about T , λ, and S(H):
1. T is a tree. 2. If G ∈ S(H), G is unprovable and fully reduced.
Proof 1. By construction, if λ(σ) is undefined, λ(σ.n) is undefined. Hence, if σ ∈ T has the property that σ ′ ∈ T for all R + σ ′ σ, so does σ.n ∈ T . 
H) which both contain σ, we can define Γ (σ) = Γ and ∆(σ) = ∆ independently of the individual hypersequents in S(H).
Given an unprovable hypersequent H, let T and S(H) be as in Definition 10 and let M = T, R, V where σ ∈ V (p) iff p ∈ Γ (σ).
and any hypersequent containing it would be provable.) So σ / ∈ V (p). If ¬ϕ ∈ Γ (σ), by Proposition 3(1), ϕ ∈ ∆(σ). By induction hypothesis, M, σ ϕ, so M, σ ¬ϕ. Similarly for ¬ϕ ∈ ∆(σ), using Proposition 3(2).
If ϕ∧ψ ∈ Γ (σ), by Proposition 3(3), ϕ ∈ Γ (σ) and ψ ∈ Γ (σ). By induction hypothesis, M, σ ϕ and M, σ ψ, so M, σ ϕ ∧ ψ.
If ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ ∆(σ), by Proposition 3(4), ϕ ∈ ∆(σ) or ψ ∈ ∆(σ). By induction hypothesis, M, σ ϕ or M, σ ψ, so M, σ ϕ ∧ ψ.
Suppose ϕ ∈ Γ (σ) and let Rστ . By Proposition 5(3) and Proposition 3(5), ϕ ∈ Γ (τ ). By induction hypothesis, M, τ ϕ. Thus, M, σ ϕ. Suppose ϕ ∈ ∆(σ). By Proposition 5(6), there is a τ such that Rστ and ϕ ∈ ∆(τ ). By induction hypothesis, M, τ ϕ, hence M, σ ϕ. ⊓ ⊔
Corollary 1
The calculus is complete for K.
Example 1 Consider the hypersequent ¬(p ∧ q) = ⇒ ¬q p = ⇒. The counterexample construction begins by labelling the components using the branch 0, 0.0:
=⇒
It is 0-reduced, but not 0.0-reduced. A 0.0-reduct, using the L rule, is:
In turn, we can apply a ¬L-reduction to the sequent labelled 0.0 to obtain
Finally, we apply a ∧R-reduction to obtain
Since ¬q ∈ ∆(0), there is a 0.1-¬q-successor, namely
Its full reduction is
We now have T = {0, 0.0, 0.1} with
The corresponding counter-example is 0 p 0.0 q 0.1 4 Cut-free completeness of RT and RD The completeness proof above can be extended to RT. First we extend Definition 8 to include the following:
where the sequent ϕ, Γ σ = ⇒ ∆ is the rightmost sequent labelled σ. Then Proposition 1 still holds:
Proposition 2 still holds. A T-reduct H ′ of a hypersequent H also extends it: Suppose ϕ, Γ is Γ (σ) is the antecedent of the rightmost sequent in H labelled σ. Then Γ ′ (σ), the antecedent of the rightmost sequent labelled σ in H ′ is ϕ, ϕ, Γ . Clearly, the number of times a T reduction can be applied to the sequent labelled σ is bounded by the sum of the degrees of the formulas in H.
Proposition 3(5) now holds in the form: If H is Red(H ′ ) for some hypersequent H ′ , then
For if Rσσ ′ , then we just have a case of Proposition 3(5). For the case σ = σ ′ , we have to show that if ϕ ∈ Γ (σ), then ϕ ∈ Γ (σ). This holds since H is fully reduced, and ϕ, Γ (σ) = ⇒ ∆(σ) is a T-reduct of Γ (σ) = ⇒ ∆(σ). Definition 10 yields a tree of unprovable hypersequents S(H) for any unprovable hypersequent H also when T reductions are included in the definition of Red. For the definition of the successor step, note that λ(σ)(σ) = Γ σ = ⇒ ∆ is the rightmost σ-labelled component of the hypersequent λ(σ). Thus, successors are computed from the fully reduced hypersequent component.
Proposition 5 still holds since it is independent of the definition of reduction.
Completeness for reflexive models now follows: If H is unprovable, S(H) is a tree of fully reduced unprovable hypersequents. Define M = T, R ′ , V as before, with the difference that the accessibility relation is the reflexive closure R ′ of R. Proposition 6 holds for S(H) and M , since the only relevant difference is the case ϕ ∈ Γ (σ), which holds by Proposition 3(5 ′ ).
Example 2 Consider the hypersequent ¬(p ∧ q), p = ⇒ ¬q p = ⇒. Again we begin by labelling the components using the branch 0, 0.0:
This hypersequent is not 0-reduced. A 0-reduct using the RT reduction is:
This is now 0-reduced. The full reduct, as before, is:
There again is a 0.1-¬q-successor, namely
The corresponding counter-example is
To prove completeness of RD for serial models, we have to ensure that the accessibility relation on T is serial. To do this, we extend Definition 9: Suppose H = G Γ σ = ⇒ ∆ is an unprovable fully reduced hypersequent, and ∆ contains no formula of the form ψ (i.e., it has no σ.n-ψ successor, where σ is the label of the rightmost sequent in H). The σ.n-successor Succ σ.n (H) of H is the hypersequent Red(G Γ σ = ⇒ ∆ σ.n = = ⇒ ). Proposition 4 also holds for σ.n-successors, by the Drop rule. Definition 10 is extended by including the σ.n-successor of H if there is no σ.n-ψ-successor. Proposition 3(5) still holds since the σ.n-successor is fully reduced as in the case for K. Proposition 5 and 6 still hold. The relation R on T in this case is serial, since for every σ that occurs as a label on a sequent either σ.0 also occurs as a label in the original labelled hypersequent H ′ , or there is a σ.n-ψ successor, or σ is the label of the rightmost sequent without a formula of the form ψ in the succedent, in which case there is a σ.n-successor.
This method of adding successors results in an infinite tree, but we can do a bit better: only add a σ.n-successor if ϕ ∈ Γ (σ), and add σ, σ to the accessibility relation. For instance, suppose we start with p 0 = ⇒ p. This is completely reduced, and has a 0.1-p successor which reduces to
There is no ψ ∈ ∆(0.1), so a 0.1.1-successor is The constructions of the K, T, and D counter-examples to RK, RT, and RDunprovable hypersequents work because once a sequent with label σ is reduced, it remains unchanged in the reduction of successors. This guarantees that in the entire tree of hypersequents, all (rightmost, in the case of RT) components labelled σ are identical. This explains why the construction does not work for RB. The crucial lemma is Proposition 3(5): If ϕ ∈ Γ (σ), Rσσ ′ , and σ ′ occurs in H ′ , then ϕ ∈ Γ (σ ′ ). Suppose we tried to define the counter-example M with the the symmetric closure of R as its accessibility relation. Then we would have to change the definition of reduction so as to not only add ϕ to the antecedent of H(σ ′ ) if ϕ ∈ Γ (σ) (with Rσσ ′ ) but also vice versa. Then Proposition 5(4) would no longer hold. Hence the prospects of extending the method of proving cut-free completeness to RB are dim.
This result is not entirely surprising. Currently, there is no linear nested sequent system for B, nor is there a cut-free hypersequent system (Lellmann 2015; Lahav 2013) . There is, however, a cut-free tree hypersequent system for symmetric logics (Poggiolesi 2011) . The structure of tree hypersequents provides more structural flexibility that is capable of accommodating symmetric frame properties. However, again we fail to see Došen's principle play out in the context of tree hypersequents.
More surprisingly, constructing transitive counter-examples for R4-unprovable hypersequents also causes difficulties. Here the problem is different and resides in the "destructive" nature of the unrestricted EW rule. Suppose we were going to define a transitive counter-example M using the transitive closure of R.
Then the definition of reduction would have to take into account not just immediate predecessors of σ (as the L reduction does), but any predecessor of σ, i.e., we would define
to be a 4-reduct of
However, if G ′′ is not empty, the unprovability of a hypersequent does not guarantee the unprovability of its 4-reduct. The best we can do is guarantee the unprovability of
using the EW and L rules. But now the new reduct is no longer an extension of the original hypersequent, and so Proposition 2 fails. The problem, in short, is that EW destroys information that is required in the subsequent reduction of a hypersequent and of its successor hypersequents. The problem can be circumvented by using rules other than EW to deal with transitivity. One could strengthen the L to the rule
or add a transitivity rule like
In both cases, the unprovability of a hypersequent would guarantee the unprovability of its 4-reducts which would furthermore be extensions of them. However, the resulting calculi no longer satisfy Došen's Principle, since the new rules are not purely (external) structural rules.
Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the question of whether Restall (2009)'s hypersequent system for S5 can be extended to other modal logics. Though these systems require only two modal rules for K and its extensions, there are some issues that arise with this approach to modal hypersequents. In particular, our method for showing cut-free completeness fails for the systems RB and RS4. One solution to the problem of RS4 is to add additional rules that manipulate modal formulas. It is unclear whether or not it is possible to develop cut-free complete relational hypersequent systems that also conform to Došen's principle. We have also noted that the system RS5 is not entirely modular. While it has been shown to be cut-free complete, in order to obtain modularity by replacing EE with Sym, we lose the cut-free completeness result.
